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Adjudication?
Wayne D. Brazilt
In recent years, courts have used special masters to help man-
age complex civil cases.1 But this use has raised serious questions
of efficacy and ethics. This paper first identifies the needs and am-
bitions that inspire courts to appoint masters, in order to demon-
strate why recourse to this tool can be so rich in potential yet so
controversial. Then, in describing some recent roles masters have
played, it assays their potential contributions as well as the risks
attending their use. It concludes that as masters are used more
ambitiously, the potential benefits and risks increase. Masters can
bring significant new skills and flexibility to bear on cases whose
complexity threatens to overwhelm our traditional system. How-
ever, a correlative danger exists that using masters will fundamen-
tally alter that system in ways we find troubling: by making adju-
dication too informal, by removing it from public scrutiny and
challenge, and by encouraging judges to rely on masters to a degree
incompatible with appropriate exercise of the judicial function.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Needs That Inspire the Use of Masters
Courts appoint special masters as a means of addressing three
overlapping categories of problems: judicial limitations, shortcom-
t United States Magistrate, Northern District of California.
I A special master is a private attorney, law professor, or retired judge who is ap-
pointed with or without the parties' consent to assist the adjudicative process. Federal
courts may rely on rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or other sources for
authority to make such appointments. For detailed discussions of authority issues, see Le-
vine, The Authority for the Appointment of Remedial SpecialMasters in Federal Institu-
tional Reform Litigation: The History Reconsidered, 17 U.C.D. L REv. 753 (1984), and Bra-
zil, Authority to Refer Discovery Tasks to Special Masters: Limitations on Existing
Sources and the Need for a New Federal Rule, in W. BRAZ, G. HAZARD, JR. & P. RICE,
MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS 305
(1983). See also ADMiNISTRATIvE OFFICE OF THE US. COURTS, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT app. C-4,
at 280; NAT'L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTiCE, HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL MASTERS
16-22 (1983).
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ings of the traditional adjudicatory system, and shortcomings of
parties and counsel. Judicial limitations include time constraints;
lack of expertise in esoteric or technologically sophisticated areas;
lack of skill in certain roles, such as the facilitation of settlement
negotiations; and limitations that stem from the proprieties of ju-
dicial conduct, at least for the judge who will try the case.
The shortcomings of the traditional adjudicatory process are
more subtle. First, our adversarial and dialectical pretrial process
institutionalizes and legitimates both distrust and the pursuit of
selfish ends. Friction is the norm in this process; yet friction saps
energy and consumes resources. Second, adjudication is hampered
by formalism. Pleading can be ritualistic and uncommunicative.
Discovery, which was designed to compensate for pleading limita-
tions, has become similarly stultified. Preoccupation with form and
fear of loss often displace substantive communication, common
sense, and good faith.
Users of the system (clients and counsel) also behave inappro-
priately. Parties sometimes commence litigation unwisely-where
there is no hope of victory, where victory would not provide an
effective remedy, or for ulterior purposes-either as a weapon to
extend economic combat beyond the marketplace, or to demon-
strate power or tenacity. Parties often experience considerable dif-
ficulty communicating, and may act more out of misunderstanding
than by clear calculation. Relations between parties are also com-
plicated by pervasive distrust. Although distrust can help parties
to protect themselves, it also clouds their judgment and inspires
overkill tactics or opaque responses to pleading and discovery.
Even if individual instances of tactical excess are negligible, they
can provoke cycles of retaliations. Occasionally hostility or bad
faith so pollutes a case that movement toward disposition becomes
virtually impossible.
B. Uses of Masters
Courts appoint special masters in an effort to circumvent
these obstacles to adjudication. But the precise roles that masters
play are changing. The oldest and least controversial uses of spe-
cial masters developed in response to limitations on judges' time
and are wholly ministerial in character. Examples include account-
ings2 and calculations of damages using court-approved formulae.'
2 See, e.g., Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
3 See Coolley, Magistrates and Masters in Patent Cases, 66 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 374, 400
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In these roles the work of masters is not controversial because it
involves no significant exercise of judgment or discretion, no legal
analysis, and no determinations of policy.
A more recent ministerial use of special masters is in the ad-
ministration and distribution of large funds generated by settle-
ments or judgments in civil class actions4 or in criminal cases in-
volving large-scale fraudulent schemes.5 The court may determine
in advance how money will be invested and how potential claim-
ants will prove their membership in the class and their proportion-
ate share of the fund. Such detailed judicial guidance, coupled with
a requirement that the master submit thorough reports to both
court and counsel, prevents the master from usurping judicial
functions.
These uses of special masters conserve substantial judicial re-
sources for the tasks of judging. However, masters cannot make
major contributions to the larger objectives of expediting and ra-
tionalizing the resolution of complex disputes if their powers are so
limited. This fact undoubtedly underlies the trend toward ex-
panding masters' responsibilities. It also helps explain why even
masters with clearly limited mandates seem pressured or tempted
to gravitate into larger spheres.' With broader duties, masters
might contribute more, but they also may invade the proper pre-
serve of the judiciary, change the character of adjudication, or in-
terject themselves into sensitive aspects of attorney-client
relations.7
n.131 (1984).
4 See Galligan, Masters to Administer Court Ordered Settlements, in ABA SECTION OF
LITIGATION, 1985 NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON NEW TECHNIQUES FOR RESOLVING COMPLEX LrIGA-
TION [hereinafter cited as NEW TECHNIQUES]. Mr. Galligan has served as principal adminis-
trator of several class action settlement funds, including the fund arising out of In re
Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 63,237 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
5 The author has served as a special master for this purpose in United States v. LaPon-
sey, No. 82-0501 WAI(SJ) (N.D. Cal. June 12, 1984) (order of appointment). The court orig-
inally referred this matter to the late U.S. Magistrate Richard Goldsmith.
6 One recent example of this phenomenon is United States v. American TeL & Tel.,
461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1978). The court initially employed the masters to help rule on
assertions of privilege with respect to massive numbers of documents. As the litigation ma-
tured, however, the court involved the masters in substantially more ambitious undertak-
ings, including an elaborate effort to narrow the issues through exchanges of statements of
contention and proof. See Hazard & Rice, Judicial Mainagement of the Pretrial Process in
Massive Litigation: Special Masters as Case Managers, in W. BRAZIL, G. HAZARD & P. RICE,
supra note 1, at 77, 82-86, 100-08; see also Strasser, On Orders from the Court, STUDENT
LAW., Jan. 1985, at 24.
7 The risk that a master might invade the attorney-client relationship is most obvious
when the master helps negotiate a settlement or plays an evaluative role, as in the Early
Neutral Evaluation program, discussed infra at notes 52-59 and accompanying text. Such an
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Recent and proposed uses of special masters that are more
ambitious and controversial involve tasks that require the skills
and responsibilities of judging' or interventionist behavior that is
generally regarded as improper for a judge. Today these categories
have begun to blur because of major changes in the courts' func-
tions, at least in the federal system. Judges are under considerable
pressure to participate actively in case development. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure invite judges to look behind the plead-
ings, to narrow the issues, and to improve communication between
litigants." The rules also encourage judges to help parties acquire
and share information, contain their costs, explore settlement, and
experiment with unusual mechanisms to resolve their differences. 10
These changes in the judicial role have two implications for
the use of masters. First, the assignment of some case management
and settlement duties to masters becomes less controversial be-
cause broader precedent exists for a neutral person to assume this
role. The second and rather ironic point is that these changes in-
tensify pressure on courts to appoint masters (or magistrates) to
perform certain interventionist functions." Greater judicial in-
volvement in case development raises ethical concerns insofar as
the judge may become biased by contact with the parties prior to
trial and the judge's power may intimidate counsel (even uninten-
tionally) during the formative stage of litigation, which could dis-
tort case development.12 By harping on these ethical concerns, crit-
ics may pressure judges to delegate the more intrusive or sensitive
tasks to masters or magistrates.
Not surprisingly, courts have used masters most ambitiously
invasion might consist of a master giving a client a much different analysis of relevant evi-
dence or law, or a much different assessment of the client's overall position in the case, than
the client has heard from her attorney.
" This paper does not catalogue every such use of masters. For a more general account
of how courts have used masters to supervise discovery events, to make threshold rulings on
assertions of privilege, or to help resolve other pretrial disputes, see Brazil, Special Masters
in the Pretrial Development of Big Cases: Potential and Problems, in W. BRAZIL, G. HAZARD
& P. RiCE, supra note 1, at 6-12.
9 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 7, 11 (the court may impose
sanctions sua sponte for an attorney's failure to inquire into the factual or legal basis for his
client's claim).
10 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16; see also Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of
Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 37 RUTGERs L. REV. 253 (1985); Peckham, The Federal Judge as Case Manager:
The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 770 (1981);
Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation, The Trial Judge's Role, 61 JUDIcATURE 400 (1978).
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 376, 426-31 (1982).
1 Id. at 424-26.
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in the most complex, resource-threatening cases. Three types of
cases are prototypical: mass torts (such as actions involving asbes-
tos,13 Agent Orange,' or DDT"), massive commercial litigation, 0
and public law cases requiring courts to fashion and implement eq-
uitable decrees that cover complex institutional relationships and
extend over considerable periods of time.' 7 The discussion below
focuses primarily on the first two categories, in part because much
literature already exists regarding masters and public institutional
reform.'"
In mass tort and complex commercial cases, courts have used
masters for a wide range of purposes. The most significant uses
have involved attempts to rationalize and streamline the process of
generating the data necessary to determine liability and damages,
as well as attempts to help the parties negotiate settlements. The
remainder of this paper presents case studies of recent uses of
masters in these areas. In each instance, the costs and benefits of
employing masters are addressed. Close analysis of these cases
should lead to a better understanding of the capabilities and po-
tential of special masters.
II. CASE MANAGEMENT AND EVALUATION
Two notable efforts at case management took place in the as-
bestos cases in Ohio and the DDT cases in Alabama. In both set-
tings, courts faced large numbers of claimants seeking relief from a
small group of defendants for injuries having some sources and
characteristics in common. The specter of processing each case
Is See, e.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases (N.D. Ohio, pending since 1980).
14 E.g., In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 94 F.R.D. 173 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) (MDL No. 381).
15 E.g., Wilhoite v. Olin Corp., No. CV-83-C-5021-NE (N.D. Ala., pending since 1983);
Hagood v. Olin Corp., No. CV-83-C-5917-NE (N.D. Ala., pending since 1983).
16 E.g., United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1347-49 (D.D.C.
1978); In re AmpiciUin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978); United States v.
IBM Corp., 76 F.R.D. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
17 E.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976);
Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), af'd, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y.
1974).
18 See the lengthy lists of articles cited in Levine, supra note 1, at nn.4, 6, 9, & 19-21.
See also Alpert, Crouch & Huff, Prison Reform by Judicial Decree: The Unintended Conse-
quences of Ruiz v. Estelle, 9 JusT. Sys. J. 291 (1984); Combs, The Federal Judiciary and
Northern School Desegregation: Judicial Management in Perspective, 13 J.L. & EDUc. 345
(1984); Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institu-
tions, 1983 DuKE L.J. 1265; Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Govern-
ance of Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1041 (1984).
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separately through conventional methods was so overwhelming
that the courts felt constrained to develop more sensible and cost-
effective strategies.
A. The Ohio Asbestos Litigation
In the Ohio asbestos litigation (GAL)19 Judge Thomas D.
Lambros appointed law professors Eric Green and Francis McGov-
ern to develop a case management plan for each category of asbes-
tos case (for example, insulation cases, suits by plant workers, suits
by brake repairers). The goals were to streamline pleading and dis-
covery practice and to set time schedules for completion of all ma-
jor aspects of case preparation. Working closely with counsel and
drawing on materials generated by national organizations or in
other asbestos litigation, the masters developed two sets of stan-
dardized documents: questionnaires for plaintiffs to provide infor-
mation about their claims, and discovery forms for interrogatories,
document production requests, and witness disclosures. Parties
who desired information not accessible through the standardized
procedures, or relief from some element of the program, could peti-
tion a single designated magistrate for assistance.2"
Because no systematic empirical evaluation of the costs and
benefits of this program has been completed, we cannot yet assess
its value. The establishment of presumptive time frames for com-
pleting each pretrial stage, based on substantial inputs from af-
fected parties, probably sped up case development and undercut
excuses offered by dilatory lawyers. And hammering out the dis-
covery questions probably helped educate counsel about the dy-
namic between facts and law.
On the other hand, negotiating the development and accept-
ance of standardized discovery forms was costly.22 A lengthy set of
interrogatories (containing hundreds of questions, counting sub-
parts) emerged as the approved form.23 This invites speculation
" In re Related Asbestos Cases (N.D. Ohio, pending since 1980).
20 See OHIO ASBESTOS LITIGATION: CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND CASE EVALUATION AND
APPORTIONMENT PROCESS Order No. 6, Dec. 16, 1983 (1983) [hereinafter cited as OHI AsBES-
TOS LMGATION]. This book includes the orders issued by Judge Lambros, the management
plan for each type of asbestos litigation, the standardized forms, and a description of the
objectives of the evaluation and apportionment project.
21 Id. at 24.
22 Interviews with Francis E. McGovern, Professor of Law, University of Alabama
School of Law (Aug. 14 & 15, 1985) (notes on file with the author) [hereinafter cited as
McGovern Interviews].
'3 See OHIO ASBESTOS LTmGATION, supra note 20, OAL Form 2 (Defendants' First Stan-
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that the masters felt constrained to include something for everyone
in order to gain support for the concept itself. Having supervised
discovery and hosted settlement conferences in asbestos cases in
California, I question the need for all the data requested by the
forms. Counsel with asbestos litigation experience seem able to
value individual claims, at least for serious settlement negotiations,
with only modest amounts of information about the plaintiff. This
observation is somewhat unfair because the case development plan
had two purposes-to equip parties for settlement negotiations
and to prepare for trial. Since only a few cases are tried, however,
the procedures may have over-rationalized the pretrial process.
2 4 If
the information necessary for settlement is much less elaborate
than that necessary for trial, the Ohio asbestos plan might have
overburdened the parties in an effort to achieve a quite secondary
goal.
Judge Lambros and masters Green and McGovern were well
aware that rational, expedited settlement was a paramount goal of
their overall strategy.25 Toward that end, the Judge ordered the
masters to undertake an even more ambitious task: to develop a
quantified system for appraising individual asbestos claims and ap-
portioning financial responsibility among defendants. The objec-
tive was to develop computer-based models or formulae for differ-
ent kinds of claims, so that the computer could digest a case's data
and decide the otherwise thorny questions about which parties
owed what to whom.26
The masters originally contemplated drawing extensively on
many different kinds of data, particularly from asbestos litigation
in Cleveland and elsewhere, then integrating that data with two
"dynamic" decision models from academic literature. The goal of
the first stage was to ascertain the settlement values of terminated
cases and to isolate and ascribe relative weight to each operative
factor in those valuations. Working with experienced local counsel,
the masters developed a list of some 300 variables that could affect
the valuation of individual asbestos cases.28 The second stage
would refine the historical analysis by imposing an overlay of dy-
dard OAL Consolidated Discovery Request to Plaintiff).
2 In fact, it appears that the OAL system's dominant objective was to facilitate settle-
ment. See id. at 2-5.
" See id.
28 Id. at 113-17.
27 Id. at 117-18.
28 McGovern Interviews, supra note 22 (Aug. 14, 1985).
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namic decision theory. 9
The objective of this plan is unimpeachable, yet in conceptual
reach it far exceeds our current abilities to grasp. It seems fair to
ask whether a mechanism of such sophistication is necessary, and
whether sufficient dividends could result to justify the massive in-
vestment of effort that it would entail. To be effective, the formu-
lae must be credible to affected parties. Credibility would require,
at a minimum, substantial efforts to educate lawyers and clients
about how the formulae were developed. The formulae probably
reflect compromises or choices between debatable positions, and
each such compromise or choice could be used by a skeptical law-
yer or client to justify rejecting the whole concept. Moreover, per-
suading lawyers and clients to accept elaborate academic decision
models might pose an even larger obstacle to "selling" this kind of
procedure. Many attorneys and clients would sense artificiality in
this heavily conceptual undertaking and would therefore distrust
it.
A thorough evaluation is impossible, since the masters were
unable to produce the comprehensive set of formulae originally en-
visioned. Still, the masters have developed quantified portraits of
numerous terminated asbestos cases from the Cleveland area, and
have used this data base to propose outer limits for settlement ne-
gotiations. To achieve this end, they gather as much information
about the pending case as is feasible and feed that data into their
computer. The computer locates the three most similar cases in its
historical file, then lists the characteristics of those three cases and
the amounts of the settlements or judgments therein. These figures
shape the ensuing negotiations. Professor McGovern reports that
because all parties "had the computerized value ranges, the law-
yers could not be too far apart and still be realistic and credible.
We ended up having demands and offers within a range of about
20 percent of the values we thought the cases would be worth.""0
But is even this scaled-down plan worth all the effort? If we
focus only on asbestos litigation in Ohio, the answer is probably
no. I have seen experienced counsel produce reasonable valuations
of asbestos cases with relatively few elements of information. And
"1 This would incorporate not only the psychology of decisionmaking and negotiating,
but also any relevant changes that might have occurred since the dispositions of the earlier
cases: changes in the law, in the general economic environment or the parties' economic
situations, or in the political context of the negotiations.
3O Center for Public Resources, CPR Legal Program Proceedings 22 (June 1984) (Fifth
Annual Meeting at Aspen, Colorado) [hereinafter cited as CPR Proceedings].
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networks of lawyers share information about values of roughly
comparable cases. As Professor McGovern has pointed out, how-
ever, the work done in Ohio might be valuable if the recently es-
tablished national claims handling facility31 will be processing sig-
nificant numbers of claims. The computer programs, lists of
variables, and valuation data generated in Ohio could prove very
useful in setting guidelines to guard against arbitrary or inconsis-
tent recommendations by adjusters, and in bolstering claimant
confidence in the fairness of settlement offers.
We know too little at this juncture to fairly assess the worth of
the masters' approach. Yet the experience in Ohio compels us to
recognize a potential problem: where a court tentatively concludes
that masters are needed because a case cannot adequately be han-
dled through established procedures, masters may feel pressured to
design wholly new systems or experiment with elaborately innova-
tive dispute resolution techniques that are expensive to generate
and to "sell" to the affected community. They may overlook avail-
able resources and downplay the utility of adapting or refining es-
tablished ways of solving problems. Given these pressures, judges
who appoint masters might consider advising them to try first to
build on traditional or accepted methods. Getting large groups of
people to adopt new ways of doing things carries a cost (in resis-
tance and education) that should be considered at the outset and
avoided if possible.
B. DDT Cases in Alabama
The role Francis McGovern has been playing as special master
in the northern Alabama DDT cases32 is less conceptually ambi-
tious and seems more derivative of familiar case management prac-
tices. Initially faced with about 4,000 claimants (the number subse-
quently rose to more than 9,000), all alleging DDT-related injuries,
Judge U.W. Clemmons and the parties' lawyers wanted to enlist
outside assistance. They selected Professor McGovern in part be-
cause of the innovative work he was doing in Ohio. Once ap-
pointed, McGovern worked with counsel to develop efficient meth-
"1 See Welligton, Asbestos: The Private Management of a Public Problem, 33 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 375 (1984-85) (discussing the design and implementation of a national claims
handling facility).
31 See cases cited supra note 15. Accounts of McGovern's work in these cases appear in
On Settling Toxic Tort Cases-The Role of Special Masters: An Interview with Francis E.
McGovern, ALTERNATVS TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Sept. 1984, at 1 (Center for
Public Resources) [hereinafter cited as Toxic Torts], and in Arthurs, Students Give DDT
Discovery a Boost, Legal Times, Aug. 13, 1984, at 1, 6-7.
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ods of case preparation. He first held hearings to consider
procedural options suggested by the parties, then added his own
ideas, and finally put together a three-track package that began
operating (by stipulation) in 1984.33
The need for innovation was obvious: the cost to both sides of
using traditional discovery methods would have been staggering.
Plaintiffs' counsel proposed selecting a group of test cases for full
pretrial development, but defendants feared a disproportionately
small or unrepresentative sample. 4 McGovern suggested a compro-
mise that offered enough to earn both sides' endorsement: he (the
neutral) would randomly select twenty cases for detailed develop-
ment through established discovery devices. Through these twenty
cases counsel could probe the evidentiary bases for the common
legal issues, such as causation, standards of care, credibility of
competing expert medical analyses, choice of law, and statutes of
limitations. McGovern served as court of first resort for disputes
over discovery; the parties almost never appealed his rulings on
routine matters.35
The real innovation of McGovern's method was in the second
pretrial track. The goal was to obtain basic factual information
from the remaining 9,000 claimants without incurring the costs of
depositions and interrogatories. This track had four significant ele-
ments: counsel worked together to negotiate an acceptable survey
questionnaire; McGovern hired and trained college students (for
$4.15 an hour) to administer the questionnaire through personal
interviews of the claimants; counsel were forbidden to attend the
interview sessions, but could send a non-lawyer to observe and re-
port deviations from prescribed procedures; and plaintiffs' counsel
agreed that any plaintiff who missed two scheduled interviews
without sufficient excuse would have the complaint dismissed.36
This procedure worked so well that the parties agreed to ex-
tend it to claims filed later.3 7 The interviewing process provoked
relatively few disputes and was completed under budget; moreover,
it weeded out about 2,500 claims.38 While it is too early to gauge
33 McGovern Interviews, supra note 22 (Aug. 14, 1985).
Id.; see also Arthurs, supra note 32, at 6.
:3 McGovern Interviews, supra note 22 (Aug. 14, 1985).
36 Id.; see also Arthurs, supra note 32, at 1, 6-7; Toxic Torts, supra note 32, at 4-7.
37 McGovern Interviews, supra note 22 (Aug. 14, 1985).
"Id. A substantial number of plaintiffs withdrew voluntarily when contacted for the
interviews, another large group was eliminated because plaintiffs' counsel could not locate
them, and about 50 were dismissed for failure to attend scheduled interviews without ade-
quate excuse.
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the utility of the data produced, Professor McGovern believes that
the parties will find it to be of significantly higher quality than the
usual answers to interrogatories.
This novel procedure raises some difficult ethical questions,
however, since claimants' interests could be sacrificed or unjustifi-
ably compromised by the streamlined procedures. After all, de-
fense counsel favored this process and agreed to fund part of its
projected cost in the expectation that it would winnow out a large
number of plaintiffs and that the neutral interviews would produce
more useful, less self-aware information than responses to interrog-
atories, which are filtered through plaintiffs' counsel.3 9 Thus, the
supervising court should have a special obligation to ensure that
each plaintiff clearly understands the ground rules, appreciates
how his interests might be adversely affected by answering ques-
tions outside his lawyer's presence, and voluntarily consents to
participate. The fact that plaintiffs' counsel could not locate sev-
eral hundred named claimants suggests that attorney-client com-
munication left something to be desired. The worse that communi-
cation is, the greater the risk that individual plaintiffs will act
without any real understanding.
Although the rules did not preclude counsel from meeting with
claimants before the interview to verify that they understood both
the questions and how their answers might be used, the plaintiffs'
lawyers generally chose not to prepare their clients. 40 This makes it
crucial for the court to ascertain that the interview questions are
appropriate, justified, and clear. In the DDT litigation, however,
neither the court nor Professor McGovern helped formulate the
questionnaire's content. The lawyers hammered out the questions
through sometimes emotional negotiations. McGovern acted only
as a shuttle diplomat, clarifying communications between counsel,
keeping frictions to a minimum and encouraging agreements, but
exercising no power over the substance of what emerged.41
Professor McGovern explains this self-conscious restraint by
saying that he feared losing his effectiveness as a mediator if he
exercised power to affect the product of the negotiations. 2 This
position is significant. Such restraint in effect elevates the interest
in securing agreements among the lawyers over the interest in as-
" Arthurs, supra note 32, at 6-7; Toxic Torts, supra note 32, at 4-7; McGovern Inter-
views, supra note 22 (Aug. 14, 1985).
40 McGovern Interviews, supra note 22 (Aug. 14, 1985).
41 Id.
41 Id. (Aug. 14 & 15, 1985).
[53:394
Special Masters in Complex Cases
suring that the data acquisition process is fair to all parties, and it
is by no means clear that these interests will coincide.
The third track in the DDT cases was called the "law track. '43
In it, all parties were free at any stage to raise by motion any po-
tentially significant legal issue. McGovern's role in this arena was
less clearly delineated than elsewhere. Under the stipulated order
of reference, Professor McGovern could rule initially on all pretrial
motions, including those raising legal or potentially case-disposi-
tive questions. He quickly recognized, however, that it would be
unwise for him to rule on motions involving substantive questions
outside his areas of expertise or raising determinative issues. Thus,
McGovern simply refused to hear such motions, leaving them for
the judge.44
Professor McGovern's role in the "law track" raises several im-
portant questions about the use of masters generally. The most ob-
vious is why a non-judge should be permitted to rule, even in a
non-binding setting, on issues of substantive law. One answer
might be to save the judge's time for other duties. But declaring
the law is a judge's most important basic function. And if the issue
is of any consequence, appeal de novo is virtually certain, thus ne-
gating any time-saving while needlessly burdening the parties. A
second answer might be to enhance the judge's consideration of the
legal issues. A sophisticated neutral, giving careful initial consider-
ation to the matter, might uncover more authorities and elevate
the debate by exposing undefended premises for arguments or new
implications of established lines of reasoning. The danger of such a
process, however, is that if the judge's ultimate ruling and reason-
ing echo the master's work, an impression may be created that the
court is not deliberating independently-or at all.
In the DDT litigation the court extended the master's role in
substantive legal matters one step further. With the parties'
knowledge, the judge asked Professor McGovern to act as a law
clerk, submitting analytical memoranda on issues raised by mo-
tion. McGovern complied, but now feels that it was a mistake to do
so, not out of concern over undue influence, but in fear of harming
his effectiveness as a mediator.45 He believes that facilitating com-
munication and promoting agreements is largely incompatible with
wielding actual or apparent power to decide important disputes.
McGovern thinks that masters risk alienating parties by exercising
43 Toxic Torts, supra note 32, at 5.
4 Id., at 5-6; see also McGovern Interviews, supra note 22 (Aug. 14 & 15, 1985).
15 McGovern Interviews, supra note 22 (Aug. 14 & 15, 1985).
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power. Parties who can be or have been hurt by a master will be
distrustful or resentful.46 McGovern assumes that a mediator can
be fully effective only if the parties have confidence in him and are
willing to talk more freely with him than with an opponent.
Professor McGovern may exaggerate the fragility of relations
between neutrals with power and litigators, as well as the extent to
which such litigators, or their clients, will confide even in someone
having no direct power over their fate. McGovern also may invest
more significance in the distinction between formal power and in-
formal influence than many litigators would. His concerns about
the potential ill effects of blurring or combining the two roles, how-
ever, arise out of considerable experience and warrant careful con-
sideration by judges deciding how to use a master most effectively.
C. Dialogue Through Storytelling: The AT&T Case
Special masters have played two additional roles in developing
complex cases that are worth describing briefly. One evolved in the
Federal government's antitrust suit against AT&T,47 which in-
volved scores of separate "episodes" of alleged misbehavior-each
of sufficient factual complexity to constitute a separate lawsuit. To
organize the judicial exploration of these events the court, the par-
ties, and the masters (Professors Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and Paul
R. Rice) groped toward a system ultimately revolving around ex-
changes and comparisons of the parties' narrative versions of each
episode.48 As first designed, the system compelled the litigants to
exchange "statements of contention and proof' (including author-
ity and evidence). These proved unwieldy and unhelpful in part
because they were loaded with argumentation and posturing, some
of which had no purpose other than preserving options to take po-
sitions that might become feasible later.49 Learning from this, the
masters requested simplified narratives describing the facts that
each side believed made up each episode. Comparing the narra-
tives exposed areas of disagreement and allowed for provisional
agreement on some facts, so that these did not need to be subjects
46 Id.
' United States v. American Tel. & Tel., No. 74-1698 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 20, 1974).
48 See United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1978). The
several roles played by the masters in this case are described in detail in Hazard & Rice,
supra note 6. The assigned judge (Hon. Harold H. Greene) and trial counsel for AT&T
(Robert D. McLean) offer comments about the procedures developed in this case in their
essays in W. BRAzi., G. HAZARD & P. RICE, supra note 1, at ix-xi and 275-92, respectively.
4' Hazard & Rice, supra note 6, at 100-05.
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of discovery or evidence at trial. °
Building on this example, courts might use masters to coordi-
nate an exchange of fact narratives and, ultimately, statements of
contention and proof. The first narratives would be used to iden-
tify the factual disputes and to guide discovery. 1 Using the narra-
tives, the masters and parties could try to isolate the legally signifi-
cant facts, in order that initial discovery could focus on disputed or
unknown facts. Parties might be more comfortable working with a
master than with the assigned judge, and using a master would
avoid the risk of the judge prematurely forming opinions about the
merits. As discovery unearths new data, the parties could edit their
narratives. This process could continue until the parties had
enough information to begin exchanging statements of contention
and proof, which they also could update as necessary. The first
statements could assist settlement negotiations and locate areas
needing eleventh-hour discovery. A subsequent set of statements
could serve as detailed roadmaps for the trial itself.
D. Early Neutral Evaluation
Another innovative use of special masters is evolving in the
Early Neutral Evaluation program in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California. 52 This experimental
program was produced by a task force of lawyers and judges ap-
pointed by Chief Judge Robert F. Peckham to seek ways to reduce
the parties' costs of civil litigation. The court directs a senior,
highly regarded, neutral litigator to host an evaluation session for a
case in an area where the litigator has substantial expertise. The
parties submit brief statements identifying issues whose early reso-
lution might materially affect the suit as well as the discovery that
should contribute most to meaningful settlement negotiations. At
the evaluation, which occurs about 150 days after the complaint is
filed and which clients as well as counsel must attend, each side
presents its case and answers questions from the evaluator. The
50 Id. at 104-08.
81 One version of this idea is described in some detail in Brazil, Improving Judicial
Controls Over the Pretrial Development of Civil Actions: Model Rules for Case Manage-
ment and Sanctions, 1981 Abs B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 873.
8" See General Order No. 26, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
(May 1985); see also Brazil, Kahn, Newman & Gold, Early Neutral Evaluation, 69 JUDICA-
TURE 279 (1986).
For a discussion of some of the ambitions for Early Neutral Evaluation when the idea
was still embryonic, see The Proposed Early Neutral Evaluation Project, in CPR Proceed-
ings, supra note 30, at 26-32.
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evaluator then frankly assesses the strengths and weaknesses of ev-
idence and arguments, and suggests an overall case valuation range
(based on educated guesses about the probability of liability and
the amount of damages). If the parties are open to exploring settle-
ment at this juncture, the evaluator may attempt to facilitate ne-
gotiations. If no settlement is reached, the evaluator helps the par-
ties plan for sharing information and conducting discovery on key
issues, in order to generate the data needed for subsequent settle-
ment efforts.53 Everything that transpires at this evaluation session
remains strictly confidential. In particular, everyone is prohibited
from discussing information resulting from the session with the as-
signed judge. 54
The program's designers hope that it will assist case develop-
ment in three ways: by affording parties a vehicle for substantive
communication, providing some inexpensive and informal discov-
ery, and forcing counsel and litigants both to investigate early and
to analyze and appraise their own situations. The evaluator's as-
sessments should serve as a reality check, and may foster early set-
tlement discussions. In complex cases much of the session will be
devoted to planning data acquisition, in the hope that the neutral
will help produce a focused, commonsense, and cost-effective dis-
covery plan. 5
This program is unique in its timing: it interposes serious case
evaluation early in litigation, before funds are spent wastefully on
ill-focused discovery.58 Masters preside, instead of judges, in part
because of the necessary time commitment and in part because the
evaluator is expected to be more assertively probing, more frank,
and more judgmental than would be appropriate for a judge, at
least one who might subsequently rule on important matters. The
53 General Order No. 26, supra note 52; see also The Early Neutral Evaluation Pro-
gram, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Special Issue 1985, at 12 (Center for
Public Resources).
54 General Order No. 26, supra note 52.
55 Some modifications have been made in the proposed program implemented by the
court. For example, no fee has been charged the parties or paid to the evaluator, and the
master has not reported to the court his or her recommendations about discovery or motion
practice. Since the program will evolve as the court learns from its experience with the first
cases processed, changes in procedures or ground rules may well occur during the next sev-
eral months. The court has appointed Hastings Law School Professor David I. Levine to
conduct an independent analysis of the effects and utility of the program.
56 Compare, for example, the program developed in the Western District of Washing-
ton under Local Rule 39.1, where attorneys who serve as settlement facilitators generally
remain uninvolved until late in the case development process. See Volunteer Attorney Me-
diation Program, Western and Eastern Districts of Washington, ALTERNATIVES TO THE
HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Special Issue 1985, at 11-12 (Center for Public Resources).
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program's designers also hope that a master can create an environ-
ment that is less formal and intimidating than the courtroom.
Since the evaluator, unlike a judge, has no power over the case, the
parties might be more candid about their objectives and
positions.57
However, some thorny difficulties also arise in this context.
Finding appropriate persons to serve as masters may be difficult.
An ideal candidate should possess recognized expertise in the field
without being so thoroughly identified with a type of client or case
that parties will distrust the master's neutrality.58 This problem,
and the related one of avoiding conflicts of interest, can be espe-
cially acute in sub-specialties of practice (such as maritime or pat-
ent law) in which only a few law firms are involved. One partial
solution to this problem is employing law professors and retired
judges as evaluators.
Another possible constraint on enlisting masters might be
their fear of being called to testify about the evaluation session, or
being sued for actions taken or opinions offered while serving as
masters. Such fears could arise in connection with virtually any
special master assignment, but are likely to be more pervasive in a
program that institutionalizes use of masters in a significant num-
ber of cases. One antidote to this problem is a court order making
confidential everything that occurs at the session.59 No one can be
confident, however, that other jurisdictions will honor such an
order.
The possibility of suits against masters raises additional con-
cerns. Would a special master be protected by the immunity doc-
trines available to judges? To what extent? Would a lawyer's mal-
practice insurance cover a suit for acts committed while serving as
a master? If not, could private attorneys insure this risk (would
carriers write such policies)? Fortunately, these issues remain
merely theoretical. To my knowledge, no party has either sued a
master or subpoenaed one for testimony.
", There is some tension between the notions that an evaluator should be assertively
probing and frank and that parties will be more candid with an evaluator because of the
informal, less intimidating environment of the early evaluation session. It is not at all clear
that clients or counsel will posture less with an evaluator, especially if they know that one
major purpose of the session is to assess the overall value of the case. Also, different evalu-
ators will have different strengths and will set different tones in the sessions, some empha-
sizing mediation techniques, others sensing a greater need for frankness of judgment.
58 See Brazil, Special Masters in the Pretrial Development of Big Cases: Potential
and Problems, in W. BRAZIL, G. HAzARD & P. RIcE, supra note 1, at 14, 64-66.
" See, e.g., General Order No. 26, supra note 52.
1986]
The University of Chicago Law Review
III. INNOVATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SETTLEMENT DYNAMIC
A. Fishing Rights in Michigan
As has been shown, special masters can add a great deal to
case management, although there are two costs: the parties lose
some control over their case, and the master necessarily has great
discretion. Different concerns are raised, however, when masters
attempt both to exercise power over case development and to par-
ticipate in settlement negotiations.
Although there is debate whether settlement facilitation by a
master will be unacceptably compromised by a delegation of for-
mal power, Professor McGovern himself successfully combined set-
tlement facilitation with considerable front-line power in a dispute
over Great Lakes fishing rights. The parties included several
tribes of Indians asserting rights based on nineteenth century trea-
ties, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Michigan Department of
Natural Resources. The suit also implicated the considerable fish-
ing interests of non-Indians. Judge Richard A. Enslen recognized
two problems at the outset: the litigation would require processing
and analysis of vast amounts of economic, scientific, and environ-
mental data, and the parties were intensely hostile regarding mat-
ters of great political sensitivity. 1 The judge decided that the case
cried out for a special master who could devote the requisite time
and attention.
In part because of the emotions permeating the case, the judge
thought it especially important that the parties have confidence in
the person who would serve as master. Toward that end, Judge
Enslen set up a procedure in which he and the parties interviewed
eleven nominees, with each party having veto power.6 2 The candi-
dates included some highly visible senior people, such as two for-
mer Attorneys General of the United States and a law school dean.
Professor McGovern emerged with the job. He had two pri-
mary assignments: to manage the pretrial case development and to
orchestrate settlement efforts.6 3 In the former capacity he wielded
considerable power over the procedural aspects of discovery. Given
his greater time resources, he could immerse himself in the details
of the case, be readily accessible to the parties, and still rule on
0 United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979), remanded, 623 F.2d
448 (6th Cir. 1980), as modified, 653 F.2d 277 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981).
Comments about McGovern's role in this case appear in Strasser, supra note 6.
01 McGovern Interviews, supra note 22 (Aug. 14, 1985).
62 Strasser, supra note 6, at 27.
63 Id.; see also McGovern Interviews, supra note 22 (Aug. 14, 1985).
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discovery disputes rapidly-thus preventing the delays that can
arise when a judge must take matters under submission for sub-
stantial periods."
Delegating responsibility for the discovery phase to a master,
then, may result in several significant advantages. First, decisions
of higher quality, based on familiarity with all the circumstances,
may be reached, and often can be delivered more promptly. Sec-
ond, the master's thorough understanding may also contribute to
more consistent rulings. This in turn can increase efficiency by
equipping counsel to identify circumstances where launching an
expensive challenge to a pretrial ruling would be fruitless. More
generally, the master's intimate knowledge of the case can be an
important stabilizing influence that discourages posturing for some
undeserved tactical advantage. Finally, a knowledgeable master
who enjoys the parties' confidence is well positioned to suggest
cost-effective, cooperative methods for sharing or acquiring
information.
The familiarity with the issues that Professor McGovern de-
veloped during discovery also proved extremely useful during set-
tlement facilitation. Lawyers believe that one of the most impor-
tant attributes of an effective settlement facilitator is command of
the relevant facts, evidence, and law.6 5 Busy judges have little time
to develop this sophisticated understanding of a complex case.
Moreover, litigators are uncomfortable when the prospective trial
judge becomes deeply involved in settlement negotiations, espe-
cially in a matter not triable to a jury.6 Lawyers are also more
frank in settlement discussions with a judicial officer who will not
preside at trial. 7 Thus, by assigning a special master as settlement
facilitator, the court can foster a negotiated disposition yet avoid
either appearing prejudiced by counsel's behavior in negotiations
or by matters learned off the record, or appearing to abuse the
power it would have at trial to pressure parties into accepting
settlements.
These considerations helped shape Professor McGovern's role
in the fishing rights case. He was expected to insulate Judge En-
McGovern Interviews, supra note 22 (Aug. 14 & 15, 1985). Special masters Paul Rice
and Geoffrey Hazard similarly believe that such benefits constituted an important part of
their contribution to the pretrial development of the AT&T litigation. See Hazard & Rice,
supra note 6, at 91-93, 109-11.
" See WAYNE D. BPszm, SETTLING CIVM Surrs: LITIGATORS' ViEws ABOUT APPROPRIATE
ROLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES 46-48, 83 (1985).
" Id. at 84.
67 Id. at 92.
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slen, to the extent feasible, from contact with the case that might
lead him to form opinions that were premature or based on unreli-
able information. Since there were no appeals from McGovern's
pretrial orders, nothing occurred to compromise this objective."
Professor McGovern's service in the Michigan fishing rights
litigation illustrates a special kind of contribution that masters can
make to the settlement process. Having studied extensively the va-
rious theories and strategies of dispute resolution, McGovern un-
derstood one of his primary responsibilities to be the introduction
of a fresh perspective in order to break down old patterns of party
interaction and conceptualization of objectives. McGovern believes
that litigants usually assume they can gain only by taking some-
thing away from their opponents.6 9 He tries to get parties to
broaden their vision and look for steps they might take, perhaps in
concert, that would create net gains for both sides. He also tries to
shake up assumptions and compel dialogue along holistic rather
than fragmented lines. In the fishing rights case, for example, he
helped each party to appreciate the limits on what it could expect
to achieve even if it "won" at trial, then tried to demonstrate that
by using a negotiated settlement to terminate their case all parties
could secure valued ends that could not be part of a court-imposed
judgment. His proposals involved governmental commitments to
establish and fund new administrative bodies that could improve
the natural resource base from which all parties could benefit for
years to come .7
It would be naive to assume that most complex cases admit of
solutions benefiting both sides. Yet a master at least has the lei-
sure to search out, analyze, and try to sell a wide range of propos-
als. Judges have little time for such creativity, and may have no
access to the people and publications generating innovative proce-
dures and ideas.
B. Agent Orange in New York
Separating the trial judge from a master who is facilitating
settlement has one obvious drawback: it may reduce the master's
leverage with and ability to persuade the parties. This considera-
tion apparently affected how Judge Jack B. Weinstein structured
his relationship with the settlement masters in the Agent Orange
'8 McGovern Interviews, supra note 22 (Aug. 14 & 15, 1985).
e' See the report on Professor McGovern's remarks in CPR Proceedings, supra note 30,
at 21-22.
70 McGovern Interviews, supra note 22 (August 15, 1985).
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litigation.7 1 Judge Weinstein's first task for special master Ken
Feinberg was to write a detailed memorandum outlining the issues
presented by the case and suggesting principles on which to allo-
cate damages among the defendants.7 2 Feinberg's ability to per-
suade parties to consider his settlement recommendations de-
pended in part on whether he could convince them of his
sophisticated understanding of relevant law. His effectiveness also
depended somewhat on parties' perceptions about how much influ-
ence his views had on the judge, or at least on the likelihood that
the judge would similarly resolve important issues.
This connection between settlement master and judge may
have been uniquely necessary in Agent Orange because of the
great uncertainty in the law.73 Since so much was left to the almost
unfettered judgment of the court, the parties might well have ig-
nored the master's opinions unless they were tied to the judge. The
situation in Agent Orange was loaded with socio-political sensitivi-
ties, and desperately in need of a solution perhaps not achievable
through more cautiously crafted procedures. On balance, it was ar-
guably worth risking so much communication between settlement
facilitator and trial judge.
However, separation generally seems much wiser. It would be
unseemly if the settlement master were ostensibly only an instru-
ment for the judge to exercise power over the litigants; judicial co-
ercion of settlement is no less attractive when indirect. Moreover,
substantial communication between a settlement master and the
judge could damage the negotiation process. Parties might become
more reluctant to speak candidly to the master and the master
might be so identified with the judge that parties resume the pos-
turing and other strategic behavior we hoped to avoid by using
masters. Off-the-record communication between master and judge
also risks creating the impression that the master is unduly influ-
encing the court. Parties could justifiably object that such ex parte
communication deprives litigants of an opportunity to challenge
the information and ideas that might influence the court's subse-
71 For a short history of the Agent Orange litigation and the multitude of judicial opin-
ions and orders it has generated, see Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex
Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHL L. REV. 337, 337 n.6 (1986).
7 See Flaherty & Lauter, Inside Agent Orange, NAT'L L.J., May 21, 1984, at 1, 39.
Other articles about the masters' roles in the Agent Orange litigation include Moore, Long
Road Ends in Agent Orange Pact, Legal Times, May 14, 1984, at 1, and Moore, Master
Says Mass Torts Don't Belong in Courts, Legal Times, Oct. 15, 1984, at 5.
73 See Flaherty & Lauter, supra note 72, at 39-41.
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quent decisions.74
Concern about a judge's indirect (or direct) participation in
settlement negotiations could be especially acute in class actions.
As Vincent Nathan has pointed out, the public might well doubt
that a judge who participated in settlement negotiations can later
make an independent determination that a proposed class settle-
ment is reasonable and fair to all members.7 5
IV. SHAPING EQUITABLE DECREES: TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AND
POLITICS IN THE BOSTON SEWAGE CASE
One other innovative role played recently by special masters
seems especially noteworthy: helping a court and parties flesh out
an equitable decree in a complex public lawsuit. Masters have long
been used to monitor compliance with injunctions or to administer
funds. But employing a master to help a court decide the content
of an injunction is more controversial.7"
A fascinating recent example of this kind of assignment oc-
curred in City of Quincy v. Metropolitan District Commission," a
case filed in Massachusetts state court in late 1982. Roughly six
months after filing, Judge Paul Garrity heard the plaintiffs' motion
for a preliminary injunction. He concluded that the defendant
Commission was seriously violating state and federal pollution con-
trol laws by permitting excessive sewage to be dumped into Boston
Harbor and its environs. Concerned that the water degeneration
might soon become irreversible, and doubting a speedy political so-
lution, the judge appointed a special master in response to plain-
tiffs' motion. The master's broad and urgent mandate was to inves-
tigate, conduct hearings, find the relevant facts, analyze possible
solutions and, within thirty days, draft a set of proposed remedies
in the form of an injunction.78
7" See Berger, Away from the Court House and into the Field: The Odyssey of a Spe-
cial Master, 78 COLuM. L. REv. 707, 724-25 (1978) (describing Judge Weinstein's behavior in
the Coney Island school desegregation case, where he remained scrupulously aloof from spe-
cial master Berger).
" Nathan, The Use of Masters to Oversee Compliance with Court-Ordered Institu-
tional Reorganization, in NEW TECHNIQUES, supra note 4; see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e), (declar-
ing that a class action "shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court").
76 See Nathan, The Use of Masters in Institutional Reform Litigation, 10 U. TOL. L.
REv. 419, 427 & nn. 60-62 (1979).
7' Civ. No. 138,477 (Mass. Dist. Ct., Norfolk County, filed Dec. 17, 1982).
71 My description of the master's role is based on an excellent article by Timothy G.
Little, Court-Appointed Special Masters in Complex Environmental Litigation: City of
Quincy v. Metropolitan District Commission, 8 HARv. ENVTL. L. Rv. 435, 473-75 (1984).
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Judge Garrity invested this considerable authority in Charles
M. Haar, Brandeis Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. The
judge permitted Professor Haar to hire a Boston attorney to serve
as deputy special master, to employ several research assistants, to
consult formally with three professors having relevant technical ex-
pertise, and to consult informally with financial experts, including
the state's bond counsel.7 9 While this staffing temporarily con-
verted the master's office into a mini-bureaucratic agency, it also
aided completion of a complex assignment in a very short time.
Moreover, because Professor Haar was appointed during the Law
School's summer recess, he could commit his full-time resources to
the master's tasks.
Professor Haar's role became a blend of traditional special
master and court-appointed expert.80 He and his staff started by
undertaking an intensive investigation of the history and current
operation of the area's sewage system. Here the master functioned
essentially as a research scholar: identifying and digesting a large
volume of documents, then conducting interviews to learn the
physical, political, and economic dimensions of the problem and its
historical evolution. At the same time, Haar also consulted exten-
sively with the EPA.81 Professor Haar informed the parties of this
ex parte investigation, and the appendix to his report to the court
identified the written sources he had examined.2 The litigants,
however, had no control over this informal process and apparently
were not afforded an opportunity to probe the reliability or bal-
ance of the sources, or to add materials to the informational
hopper.
This lack of adversarial challenge, so different from traditional
concepts of formal adjudication, is extremely significant. Professor
Haar's initial ex parte investigations largely defined the issues for
subsequent work. Moreover, while he assured the parties that he
would base his ultimate findings of fact solely on evidence intro-
duced at hearings and documents in the public record, he viewed
this first private work as laying "a foundation for the eventual
findings of fact and proposed remedies."8
79 Id. at 444-45.
"o Authority for making such appointments in the federal system might be derived
from rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. It is also arguable that courts have inherent
authority to make such appointments. For a discussion of this issue, see the sources cited
supra note 1.
8 Little, supra note 78, at 446 n.94.
*8 Id. at 446-47.
Id. at 446.
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An unusual dimension of Professor Haar's work in City of
Quincy is that he viewed his role as partly political.84 He decided
that feasible long-range solutions would require the support of the
public and of the many governmental agencies operating and regu-
lating the sewage system. He encouraged that support in several
ways. First, he tried to comprehend the perspectives and problems
of the affected governmental agencies and to persuade them of his
understanding and sympathy. This may have been a goal of his ex
parte interviews. It clearly affected his report in that he repeatedly
expressed strong respect for the roles played by the defendant
agencies.8 5 In addition, his substantive recommendations included
procedures to accommodate agency inputs and to utilize their
resources.
More controversially, Professor Haar intentionally drafted his
report so as to "arouse public opinion and illustrate [how] the
problem had been 'ducked, postponed, and put away' by previous
reports."' He tried to make his report an instrument to "actively
. . . rearrange political agendas by stimulating public opinion. "87
And while preparing his investigation he publicly toured the four
treatment plants primarily targeted by the suit, accompanied not
only by the parties, but also by "media representatives and inter-
ested citizens."88 Apparently Professor Haar did all this without
alienating any affected parties. His efforts reportedly led to im-
proved communication and cooperation by the agencies involved.
More dramatically, all parties greeted his report with enthusiasm
and, shortly thereafter, voluntarily agreed to comply with its rec-
ommended remedies.8 " Thus the master's report became the settle-
ment, and Judge Garrity never had to rule on plaintiffs' motion for
an injunction. Instead, he appointed Professor Haar to monitor the
implementation of the stipulated disposition.
Professor Haar is not the only special master who has sensed
and responded to the politics of his work environment. Vincent M.
Nathan, while overseeing implementation of equitable decrees
aimed at reforming major prison systems, has dealt "directly with
the 'hidden defendants,'" including legislators, governors, and
public agencies, who, in his eyes, "are essential elements of the
84 Id. at 473-74.
85 Id. at 474.
"Id. at 473-74.
"Id. at 474.
"Id. at 446-47.
88 Id. at 467.
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compliance process."90 He also has used informal consultations
with parties to try to understand underlying problems and to facil-
itate amicable relations.9 "
V. SOME CAUTIONS
As has been shown, special masters are making innovative
contributions to our system of dispute resolution and helping the
courts successfully process the most unwieldy, potentially intermi-
nable cases. The achievements of special masters in the areas of
case management, settlement facilitation, and ongoing decree im-
plementation give us cause for celebration. Yet this success is at
best partial: new dangers lurk just below the surface as we move
out of the mainstream. This final section discusses some of the
problems we must confront and solve if we are to continue delegat-
ing ambitious tasks to special masters.
A. Masters' Discretion and Judicial Responsibility
Two competing schools of thought exist about how courts
should supervise masters. According to one school, 92 the best or-
ders of reference are phrased only in generalities. This frees the
master, who will get to know the case much more intimately than
will the judge, to tailor procedures to evolving needs, to act quickly
and informally, and to acquire the influence (or power) over liti-
gants and counsel necessary to serve effectively and minimize ap-
peals of his rulings. Advocates of this approach tend to trust mas-
ters' discretion, to be skeptical of judges' capacity to predict how
best to employ masters, and to disparage procedural formalism.
They fear that the cost and time savings of using a special master
will be dissipated if the judge invades the master's sphere or forces
the master to make lengthy reports or to obtain judicial approval
for most acts.
The other school of thought emphasizes the court's need to
O0 Nathan, supra note 75, table 3, at 7.
Id.
" The word "school" probably suggests more coherence and visibility than the real
world situation warrants. It might be more accurate to say that some people would err on
the side of looser, more general orders of reference, while others would err on the side of
tighter, more specific orders. One high-visibility, experienced master who apparently falls in
the former group is Vincent M. Nathan, who has expressed the view that, at least for imple-
menting equitable decrees in institutional reform litigation, the best orders of reference are
cast in general terms. See Remarks by Vincent M. Nathan, in NEW TECHNIQUES, supra note
4. See generally Nathan, supra note 76 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of a
reference and examining the effectiveness of the reference technique).
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maintain tight control over both the master and the case. Orders of
reference should describe the master's duties and powers as specifi-
cally as possible. Courts also should require the master to file fre-
quent and formal reports, and should prohibit him from any ex
parte communication with either the court or any litigant. Adher-
ents to this school believe that insulating the assigned judge from
case development, as was done in the Michigan fishing rights liti-
gation, can have serious negative consequences. The judge may
learn too little about the relevant facts, law, or the lawyers' behav-
ior to rule properly on appeals from the master's decisions. If his
knowledge remains superficial, the judge is more likely to defer to
the master and thus be unable to verify the correctness and wis-
dom of the master's actions. A master operating in such an envi-
ronment acquires a great deal of power that is susceptible to abuse.
Parties who perceive few restraints on the master's power may be
intimidated or frustrated into abandoning significant rights.
The judge who stands aloof from case development may be
unable to control litigants and their lawyers, whereas a judge fa-
miliar with the case can by his presence encourage parties to act
responsibly and civilly and avoid contentious behavior. In contrast,
if the parties observe the judge's detachment they may succumb to
temptations to posture for undeserved advantages. If the special
master is weak, the parties may try to manipulate him. Thus the
remote judge poses three threats to case development: the judge
will be unable to discharge his judicial function, the master will
abuse his power, and litigants will skew the process through undis-
ciplined behavior.
When a special master conducts substantial out-of-court in-
vestigation, as Professor Haar did in City of Quincy, new problems
arise. The master is functioning like a court-appointed expert (or a
continental judge), but without the procedural safeguards that
check the reliability of an expert's reasoning and conclusions. As
the Manual for Complex Litigation, Second, points out, court-ap-
pointed experts, unlike masters, may be targeted for pretrial dis-
covery, may be deposed, and usually testify at trial, where they are
subject to full cross-examination." Moreover, the appointed ex-
pert's work enjoys no presumption of correctness, whereas in mat-
ters tried to the bench a special master's findings of fact, unless
clearly erroneous, must be accepted by the court.94 In addition, a
13 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LIGATION, SECOND § 21.51 (1985).
9 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2); see also Coolley, supra note 3, at 397-99. But see id. at 405
& n.164 (citing Livas v. Teledyne Movable Offshore, Inc., 607 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1979), for
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court-appointed expert has less power than a master to frame is-
sues and to control their exploration. Because the court receives
less from an appointed expert, it is less likely to rely as heavily on
or defer completely to her as it might to a master having both a
broader mandate and legal training.
The procedural differences between using masters and using
court-appointed experts might make judges hesitate to use masters
to ameliorate the court's lack of expertise in an esoteric subject
area. For example, special masters in high-tech intellectual prop-
erty cases are often lawyers with specialized engineering back-
grounds.9 5 Their dual expertise in substantive law and science can
create a real risk of judicial abdication of the ultimate responsibil-
ity to decide legal issues.98 Use of a court-appointed expert, in con-
trast, poses less of a threat to the court's independence of mind,
since the expert's views are testable through cross-examination and
must compete openly, on even terms, with the views of the parties'
experts.
Thus, when a special master is employed to investigate a com-
plex situation and propose solutions, or to lend the court expertise
in some sophisticated technological or other esoteric subject, seri-
ous dangers may face our dispute resolution system. Because par-
ties often lack an opportunity to challenge the master's findings,
and generalist judges may be tempted to rely too heavily on the
master's expertise, the resulting decision may be less well reasoned
and less acceptable to affected parties than if a court-appointed
expert had been utilized instead. The rules applying to experts in-
corporate mechanisms to test publicly the appointee's work and to
guard against the problems that can arise when the court's agent is
not limited, in forming his opinions, to information on the record.
This issue is especially sensitive in public law cases, where a
master can affect important policies or social institutions. These
cases demonstrate an acute need to maximize public confidence in
the proposition that "a district court has an obligation to determine that the findings of the
master are not clearly erroneous regardless of whether any objection is made to the master's
report").
11 Cf. Coolley, supra note 3, at 400 & n.131 (discussing other issues that are appropri-
ate for reference to a special master). Judge Robert P. Aguilar, U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, also has appointed masters in this kind of case. See, e.g.,
Syquest v. Micro Storage, C85-20321 RPA (N.D. Cal. July 9, 1985) (order of appointment of
special master); IBM v. Cybernex, C83-1277 RPA (N.D. Cal. May 20, 1983) (same).
" See Coolley, supra note 3, at 398-99 & n.123 (stating that courts can avoid being
confined by the clearly erroneous standard if, in their orders of reference, they direct the
master "only to report the evidence or to make recommendations").
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the openness and fairness of the decision process.9 7
B. Informality
Special masters are touted for their ability to proceed much
more informally than a judge in managing case development, fos-
tering settlement, and implementing equitable decrees.9 8 Informal-
ity has much to commend it: it can refresh relations, open commu-
nications, reduce self-protective actions, cut costs, and generally
infuse litigation with common sense. It can eliminate the delay and
expense associated with full briefing, staged argumentation, and
written opinions. I have found, in my work as a magistrate, that
informal conferences often suffice to resolve emerging discovery
disputes or to plan for sharing information and for advancing the
pretrial process.
Informality, however, may also impose costs and create
problems. For example, one informal procedure masters use is the
quick-fix discovery ruling, often given over the telephone after a
brief argument by counsel.9 9 Prompt rulings can save parties con-
siderable expense and expedite the pretrial process. But the depth
of consideration, by both counsel and the neutral, is necessarily
limited. I have been forced to acknowledge that fact by parties urg-
ing reconsideration of my tentative discovery rulings. In some in-
stances, my initial instinct was misplaced, the situation was more
complex than I appreciated, and after more careful consideration I
have reversed my original decision. These sobering experiences
have not led me to conclude that most discovery disputes require
formal briefing and argument. But I have become more sensitive to
the dangers inherent in speedy and wholly oral procedures.
Informality may create a related danger of imprecision. If the
neutral renders fuzzy decisions, or imposes poorly-specified obliga-
tions, he sets the stage for breaches, disputes, and disillusion. He
also creates opportunities for lazy or unscrupulous counsel to take
advantage of others. Without a precise foundation, it is virtually
impossible to impose sanctions or otherwise control the litigants.
These unfortunate consequences of imprecision can be especially
troublesome and costly in complex cases, where duties are less self-
97 See Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-90 (1984); see also Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976); Comment,
Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88 HARv. L. REv. 779 (1975).
, See Hazard & Rice, supra note 6, at 91-93, 109-11.
"The author has used this technique in many cases in which all discovery matters
have been referred to him.
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evident and where the ripple effects of poor communication on one
matter can extend to many others.
Conducting business off the record is a potentially more troub-
lesome informality. Arguably, communicating without the costs, in-
hibition, and posturing that accompany recorded proceedings is a
virtue of using special masters, especially in the pretrial period. A
master working away from public scrutiny may more easily con-
vince the parties to talk candidly about their objectives and con-
cerns and be more flexible in eschewing impractical but technically
defensible positions to pursue commonsense solutions. Communi-
cating ex parte can arguably increase these benefits of proceeding
off the record. A master may discern the parties' real agendas and
induce cooperative attitudes through sympathy, frankness, or
pressure.
Private proceedings may well offer significant advantages in
some pretrial situations, most obviously in settlement conferences.
Yet we may exaggerate how much counsel's behavior changes sim-
ply because no transcript is being made. Also, we may not fully
appreciate the risks entailed in proceeding in this manner. In my
experience the absence of recording often affects the tone or style
of conversation, but not its substance or purpose. Counsel remain
quite self-conscious; they continue to posture, albeit more gently
and subtly, for the neutral's sympathy. Litigators seldom forget
that a key objective is to shape the neutral's perceptions to serve
their client's interests. Thus, lawyers are not suddenly transformed
from self-protective partisans into trusting nonpartisans, inter-
ested only in justice, responsibility, and cost-effective information
sharing: they remain lawyers. This counsels some caution in going
off the record, for litigators may become even more manipulative,
less forthright, and less thoughtful than if they knew the neutral
could reproduce their words later and hold them strictly
accountable.
The absence of a record can create similarly perverse incen-
tives for the neutral. A retired judge who recently served as a
master handling discovery in a complex case told me that he acted
very differently when a record was being made. Off the record he
felt freer to cajole or pressure counsel. He also may have felt less
constrained in arriving at and articulating his decisions. Yet this
master, as a former judge, had been schooled for years in the vir-
tues of thoughtfulness and restraint. Other special masters might
be even more likely to slide into unbecoming, unwise, or unfair
behavior.
The absence of a record can both exaggerate a master's sense
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of power (by removing the constraint of appellate review) and in-
crease temptations to abuse it. The most likely abuse is not born of
malice or bias, but of sloppiness or sloth. Thus risks arise that the
master's reasoning will be faulty and that the parties will disparage
his rulings because of failure to understand the reasoning underly-
ing them. In our system, power is illegitimate unless we expose the
basis upon which it is exercised. This observation should make us
cautious about proceeding off the record or ex parte. The distrust
that such communications can engender could negate all the bene-
fits that informality is intended to achieve.
C. Masters in Political Roles
Masters' apparent successes as quasi-judicial politicians raise
many perplexing questions about masters' roles in these cases.
Given that judges issue orders affecting complex institutional rela-
tionships and having significant political and economic implica-
tions, should we consider expanding or changing the processes by
which courts reach their decisions? These decisions may impinge
on all of society, but who should be allowed to participate in the
decisionmaking processes? Should courts be explicitly permitted to
take into account political considerations, for example, in selecting
feasible remedies? Should courts attempt to influence public opin-
ion in order to facilitate implementation of legal rulings? Should
the judiciary's capacity to perform administrative functions be ex-
panded so that it could implement its own orders or step in to fill
legally mandated but unmet administrative needs? Changes along
these lines might rob the judiciary of the appearance of neutrality
and objectivity arguably essential to perceptions of its legitimacy
and authority.
Some commentators argue that the risk of polluting the judici-
ary with politics is greater than the potential benefits of more po-
litically sophisticated judicial behavior. If that is true, should
courts tolerate quasi-political behavior by special masters that
would be unacceptable or unwise in judges? We must recognize
that judges may employ the less visible and less accountable
master to play roles or pursue ends deemed improper for the
courts. Such use of masters might jeopardize public confidence in
the integrity of the judiciary itself.
D. Neutrality
One difficult issue regarding a master's proper role arises fre-
quently in nearly every context. What should or may a master do
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when he perceives a legal theory, or a line of reasoning, or a source
of evidence, that would substantially improve one party's position
but to which that party seems oblivious? Does a master have a
right or a duty to share his perception? More generally, should the
master help a clearly weaker party against a stronger opponent, or
prevent a party from accepting an unfairly low settlement? These
questions go to the heart of the adversary system. The answers for
masters may be the same as for judges-but the answers for judges
are less than self-evident. 00
CONCLUSION
None of this should be read as an argument against using mas-
ters or as a blanket condemnation of more flexible, less structured
procedures. The ponderousness and cost of our inherited proce-
dures create a pressing need to develop more efficient means to
achieve justice. But we must take care that new methods include
adequate safeguards against subtle corruptions of neutrals and
misbehavior by litigants. In the past we have relied on the public
visibility of our procedures and on precision in our pronounce-
ments to assure the accountability essential to all actors in the liti-
gation drama. We should hesitate to abandon these features of the
system until we have developed similarly effective sources of re-
straint and intellectual discipline.
We must also keep in mind that the special master is not a
procedural panacea. The problems that embarrass and encumber
our system have roots too deep in our institutions and in human
nature to admit of complete solution. Appointing special masters
will not convert litigants and lawyers into saints. We can reasona-
bly hope only for modest gains. Carefully used, masters will help
the courts sustain the tension that prevents the dispute process
from unravelling altogether.
100 See W. BRAZIL, supra note 65, at 58 (reporting that most of the lawyers surveyed
believe that a judge hosting a settlement conference who thinks that a party is about to
accept a clearly unreasonable settlement should not intervene). Note, however, the great
differences of opinion on this sensitive question between the plaintiffs' and defense bars.
The majority of plaintiffs' lawyers believe that the judge should take some action in this
situation. Id. at 61.
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